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Abstract—Recent studies have shown that graph neural networks are vulnerable against perturbations due to lack of robustness and
can therefore be easily fooled. Most works on attacking the graph neural networks are currently mainly using the gradient information to
guide the attack and achieve outstanding performance. Nevertheless, the high complexity of time and space makes them
unmanageable for large scale graphs. We argue that the main reason is that they have to use the entire graph for attacks, resulting in
the increasing time and space complexity as the data scale grows.
In this work, we propose an efficient Simplified Gradient-based Attack (SGA) framework to bridge this gap. SGA can cause the
graph neural networks to misclassify specific target nodes through a multi-stage optimized attack framework, which needs only a much
smaller subgraph. In addition, we present a practical metric named Degree Assortativity Change (DAC) for measuring the impacts of
adversarial attacks on graph data. We evaluate our attack method on four real-world datasets by attacking several commonly used
graph neural networks. The experimental results show that SGA is able to achieve significant time and memory efficiency
improvements while maintaining considerable performance in the attack compared to other state-of-the-art methods of attack.
Index Terms—Node classification, Adversarial attack, Graph neural networks, Efficient attack, Network robustness
F
1 INTRODUCTION
R ECENTLY, with the enormous advancement of deep learning,many domains like speech recognition [1] and visual object
recognition [2], have achieved a dramatic improvement out of the
state-of-the-art methods. Despite the great success, deep learning
models have been proved vulnerable against perturbations. Specif-
ically, Szegedy et al. [3] and Goodfellow et al. [4] have found
that deep learning models may be easily fooled, when a small
perturbation (usually unnoticeable for humans) is applied to the
images. The perturbed examples are also termed as “adversarial
examples”.
Graph structures are ubiquitous in nature and society and there
are a great deal of research interest in studying graph data [5], [6],
[7], [8], [9]. Undoubtedly, graph plays a crucial role in many high
impact applications in the world [8], [10], [11]. Therefore, the
importance of the robustness of deep learning models on graph
data must not be emphasized too much. However, the adversarial
examples do have a significant effect on graph data, which is still
a major obstacle to be overcome. So far, much of the current
work on attacking graph neural networks has concentrated on
node classification task [12], [13], [14], [15]. In order to fool a
classifier and misclassify specific nodes, attackers may use two
attack strategies to achieve the adversarial goals: direct attack and
influence attack. For the direct attack, an attacker can perturb the
target node without restriction while the influence attack is limited
to a few attacker nodes (usually the neighboring nodes of the target
node) [12]. Figure 1 demonstrates a toy example of how deep
learning models are fooled by attackers with small perturbations
on the graph structure. In this case, the influence attack strategy is
adopted.
In this paper, we focus on the targeted attack that aims to make
a specific node (e.g., a person in social networks) misclassified.
In this scenario, Dai et al. [13] study the adversarial attack
on graph structure data and propose a gradient-based method,
namely GradArgmax, which modifies links based on gradients of
a surrogate model so as to fool the classifiers. In addition, Zu¨gner
et al. [12] propose Nettack, which is capable of perturbing the
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Fig. 1: Adversarial attacks on the graph structure.
Attackers tend to flip the edges of attacker nodes
and lead to the misclassification of the target node.
graph structure as well as node features to spoof the classifiers.
Despite great success, there are some challenges for the attackers.
Challenges: (i) Scalability. Most methods of attack have to
store unnecessary graph information and thus suffer from the ris-
ing time and memory costs as the data scale increases. Naturally,
they fail to efficiently conduct attack on a larger graph. However,
multi-million-scale graph networks are common in real-world, so
existing methods need to be improved and scaled to larger graphs.
(ii) Evaluation. A further challenge is to quantify the effects of
adversarial attacks on graph data. As the graph data is unable and
meaningless to be converted to continuous form, the impacts on
the graph data are unable to be measured with `2-norm or `∞-
norm [16], which is distinct from that on image data. This makes
the evaluation of the attack impacts a difficult problem to solve.
In this work, we aim to tackle these challenges through our
proposed methods. Specifically, our methods include two parts: (i)
SGA framework. We argue that it is unnecessary to use the entire
graph to attack since attackers simply focus on misclassifying
several nodes (the target nodes). Besides, due to the lack of time
and space efficiency, Graph Convolution Network (GCN) [8] is
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2unfit to serve as a surrogate model despite being used frequently
in previous works. Inspired by Simplified Graph Convolutional
Network (SGC) [17] and gradient-based attack methods [13],
[15], we propose a novel Simplified Gradient-based Attack
(SGA) framework for effective and efficient adversarial attacks.
SGA only needs a much smaller subgraph consisting of k-hop
neighbors of the target node (k depends on the number of SGC
layers and typically set to 2), and sequentially flips edges with
the largest magnitude of gradients in this subgraph by leveraging
the surrogate model SGC. In addition, We introduce a scale
factor for dealing with the gradient vanishing during attacks
(See section 4.3.1). Notably, our experimental evaluation suggests
that the simplifications can hardly affect the attack performance.
Moreover, the resulting model can remarkably improve the time
and space efficiency — even yields up to 1,976 and 5,753 times
speedup over Nettack on Pubmed dataset in the direct attack and
influence attack settings, respectively. Naturally SGA can scale to
very large datasets easily. (ii) Degree Assortativity Change (DAC).
Previous studies focus primarily on the intrinsic properties of
graph [18], [19], but measuring the impact of graph adversarial
attacks is however left unexplored so far. To address this problem,
we also propose a practical metric named Degree Assortativity
Change (DAC), which can measure the intensity of the impact
after perturbations being performed.
The main contributions of our works are summarized as
follows:
• We propose a novel adversarial attack framework SGA,
which extracts a much smaller subgraph centered at the target
node, thereby addressing the difficulty of conducting attacks
on a large scale graph.
• We notice the problem of gradient vanishing for gradient-
based attack methods and solve it by introducing a scale
factor to calibrate the model.
• We emphasize the importance of unnoticeability of adversar-
ial attacks on graph data and propose, first of all, a practical
metric DAC to measure the attack impacts conveniently. This
work can also be further developed in the graph domains.
• We conduct extensive experiments on four datasets by attack-
ing several widely adopted graph neural networks. The ex-
perimental results show that our attack method has achieved
significant improvements in both time and space efficiency
while maintaining a significant attack performance compared
to other state-of-the-art attack methods.
2 RELATED WORK
Our work consists of two parts: adversarial attack on graph data
and evaluation of the attack impact. In this section, we begin with
the introduction of previous works of adversarial attacks on graph
data and then discuss the details of ensuring the unnoticeability of
adversarial attacks.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks on Graph Data
Increasing attention has been paid on the robustness and security
of deep learning models, there has been a surge of interests in
the adversarial attacks [3], [4], [20], [21], [22]. The obtained
results suggest that deep learning models are prone to adversarial
examples and could be easily fooled by them even under restricted
black-box attack scenarios (attackers conduct attacks without any
prior knowledge about the target model [23]).
While previous works focus mostly on non-graph structure
data (e.g., images and texts), adversarial attacks on graph structure
data are considerably less studied because of the discreteness,
which means that attackers must limit the attacks in order to main-
tain the graph property and allow only a few edges to be flipped in
the graph. To conduct a practical black-box attack on graph data
with limited information, attackers often train a surrogate model
locally to generate adversarial examples (perturbed graphs) and
transfer them to fool the target models.
To be specific, we are concentrating on the task of node
classification in this work. By referring to [23], we divide current
approaches of adversarial attacks on the graph into two categories:
2.1.1 Gradient-based attack
This is the most commonly used method. Gradients have been
successfully used to perform attacks in other domains [3], [24].
Since most of the existing models are optimized with gradient,
along or against the direction of it is an efficient way to generate
destructive adversarial examples. Focusing on the targeted attack,
Dai et al. [13] propose GradArgmax, which extracts gradients of
the surrogate model, and flips edges with the largest magnitude
of the gradient to generate adversarial examples. However, they
restrict the attacks to edge deletion only because the whole graph
is stored with a sparse matrix (results in the lack of gradients
information of non-edges). For the non-targeted attack that is un-
differentiated and global [23], Zu¨gner et al. [15] utilize the meta-
gradients to solve the bi-level problem underlying the challenge of
poisoning attacks (a.k.a, training-time attacks). Similarly, Xu et al.
[25] propose PGD structure attack that conducts gradient attacks
from a perspective of first-order optimization.
2.1.2 Non-gradient-based attack
As well as methods focused on gradients, attackers prefer to
explore other heuristic algorithms to conduct attacks. Waniek et al.
[26] propose “Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally” (DICE),
conducting attack by dropping edges between nodes with high
correlation and connecting edges with low correlation. Moreover,
Zu¨gner et al. [12] study both poisoning attacks and evasion attacks
(a.k.a test-time attack), based on a linear GCN model and further
propose Nettack, which maximizes the misclassification loss of
the surrogate model greedily and perturbs the graph structure and
node features to fool the classifiers.
2.2 Unnoticeability of Adversarial Attacks
Typically, in an adversarial attack scenario, attackers not only con-
centrate on the attack performance but also seek to be concealed
to avoid the detection. However, previous works usually conduct
attacks under a fixed budget and thought it would be unnoticeable
as if the budget is small enough. We argue that it is not sufficient
to preserve the properties of graphs and ensure the unnoticeability
in most cases.
To bridge this gap, Zu¨gner et al. [12] enforce the perturbations
to ensure its unnoticeability by preserving the graph’s degree
distributions and feature co-occurrences, restricting them to be
marginally modified before and after attacks. However, there is
still no practical metric to measure the impact of attacks on graph
data.
On the other hand, researches on the graph (or network) struc-
ture have yielded several results with respect to certain important
properties, including “small-world effect” [27], [28] and degree
3distributions [29], [30]. Unlike previous works, Newman et al.
[18] and Foster et al. [19] focus on another important network
feature, i.e., assortativity, and propose a number of measures of
assortative mixing appropriate to various mixing types. Generally
speaking, assortativity can be defined as the tendency of nodes to
connect to each other, it is generally viewed as a metric to probe
the properties of a specific graph, and also to some extent reflects
the graph structure. Despite its popularity in network analysis and
worthy of further study, it has not yet been used to measure the
impact of such adversarial attacks on graphs. Therefore, we aim
to bridge the gap and apply it to graph adversarial learning.
TABLE 1: Frequently used notations in this paper.
Notations Descriptions
G Graphical representation of the data
V Set of vertices in the graph
E Set of edges in the graph
C Set of class labels of nodes
N , C, F Number of nodes, classes and dimensions
A Adjacency matrix of the graph, N ×N
X Feature matrix of the nodes, N × F
D Diagonal matrix of the degree of each vertex, N ×N
fθ Graph neural networks model
W Trainable weight matrix, Fl × Fl+1
Z Prediction probability of nodes, N × C
t Target node to attack
 Scale factor to calibrate the model
D(u, v) The shortest distance between u and v
N (t) Set of nodes adjacent to node t
k Radius of the subgraph
A
Set of attacker nodes,
A = {t} for direct attack,
A = N (t) for influence attack
M Degree mixing matrix
r Degree assortativity coefficient
∆ Attack budget
G′, A′, X′ Perturbed graph, adjacency matrix, feature matrix
L˜t, L˜(sub)t Targeted misclassification loss on the graph or subgraph
S Structure score matrix
G(sub) The k-hop subgraph
V (sub), E(sub) Set of nodes, edges in the subgraph
A(sub) Adjacency matrix of the subgraph
E(exp) Set of expanded edges in the subgraph
3 PRELIMINARY
Before presenting our proposed methods, we will first give the
notations of graph data formally, and then introduce the surrogate
models of the GCN family, finally clarify the details of other
proposed adversarial attack methods. See Table 1 for frequently
used notations.
3.1 Notations
Specifically, we focus on the task of semi-supervised node
classification task in a single, undirected, attributed graph. For-
mally, we define G = (A,X) as an attributed graph, where
A ∈ {0, 1}N×N is a symmetric adjacency matrix denoting the
connections of the N nodes, and X ∈ {0, 1}N×F or X ∈ RN×F
represent the binary or continuous node features with F dimen-
sion. We use V to denote the set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V the
connected edges of the graph G; C = {ci} denotes a set of class
labels where ci indicates the ground-truth label of node i, and we
define C as the number of classes in C.
3.2 Graph Convolution Network Family
3.2.1 Vanilla Graph Convolution Network (GCN)
Since a number of existing works [12], [13], [15], [25] use
vanilla GCN [8] as a surrogate model to conduct attacks, thus
we first introduce GCN and further draw attention on SGC [17]
— a simplified variant of GCN. Refer to this work [8], GCN is
recursively defined as
H(l+1) = σ(D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2H(l)W (l)) , (1)
where A˜ = A+IN is the adjacency matrix with self-loops. IN is a
N by N identity matrix, and D˜ii =
∑
j A˜ij is a diagonal degree
matrix. W (l) ∈ RFl×Fl+1 is a trainable input-to-hidden weight
matrix and H(l) ∈ RN×Fl is the matrix of hidden representation
(activation), both of which are related to the lth layer. Particularly,
F0 = F , H(0) = X is the input of neural network. σ(·)
represents the element-wise activation function of network and
is usually defined as ReLU (·) = max (·, 0).
For node classification task, consider GCN with one hidden
layer, and let Aˆ = D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2 , then the forward of GCN with
pre-processing step could be taken as
Z = fθ(A,X) = softmax (Aˆ ReLU (AˆXW
(0)) W (1)) , (2)
where Z ∈ RN×C is the output matrix of GCN indicates the
prediction probability of nodes belonging to different classes,
and the softmax activation function, defined as softmax(xi) =
1
z exp(xi) with z =
∑
i exp(xi), is applied row-wise.
Given a set of labeled nodes VL ⊆ V with ground-truth labels
CL ⊆ C, the goal of GCN is to learn a mapping function g : V →
C by minimizing the cross-entropy loss:
L(θ;A,X) = −
∑
i∈VL
lnZi,ci , Z = fθ(A,X) , (3)
where ci ∈ CL is the class label of node i and θ = {W (0),W (1)}
denotes the trainable weights of model. After being optimized with
Gradient Descent [31], the weights are learned to predict nodes in
an unlabeled set VU = V − VL.
3.2.2 Simplified Graph Convolutional Network (SGC)
The drawback of vanilla GCN is the excessive computational
cost of message aggregation between nodes and their neighboring
nodes, which is repeatedly and unnecessarily computed during
training. To address this problem, Wu et al. [17] theoretically
analyze the structure of GCN and further propose a linear variant,
namely SGC. SGC replaces the nonlinear activation function
ReLU (·) with identity function and collapses weight matrices
between consecutive layers. In this way, the forward of GCN can
be simplified as
Z = fθ(A,X) = softmax (Aˆ ReLU (AˆXW
(0)) W (1))
= softmax (AˆAˆXW (0) W (1))
= softmax (Aˆ2XW ) ,
(4)
where W = W (0) W (1) is a collapsed weight matrix. With pre-
computing Sˆ = Aˆ2X , the complicated GCN structure can be
simplified as an input-to-output fully-connected neural network
(FNN) [32] without any hidden units, thereby avoiding redundant
computation and greatly reducing training time and memory.
43.3 SOTA Adversarial Targeted Attack Methods
For adversarial attacks on graphs, attackers may conduct structure
attack or feature attack [23] to modify the graph structure or
node features, respectively. Following the work [12], we assume
that attackers have prior knowledge about the graph structure and
node features, including ground-truth labels of nodes. Beyond that,
attackers are not allowed to access any additional information
about the target models, neither model architecture nor parameters.
In this case, attackers often train a transferable surrogate model
locally, perform perturbations to fool it to achieve the best result
of misclassification, and eventually transfer to other target models.
Since we focus on the targeted attack in node classification task,
here we briefly introduce other proposed state-of-the-art targeted
attack methods: Nettack [12] and GradArgmax [13].
3.3.1 Nettack
Similar to SGC, Nettack uses a linear variant of two-layer GCN as
a surrogate model to conduct targeted attack. Given a target node
t and a budget ∆ ∈ N, Nettack modifies the graph structure and
node features aiming to maximize the misclassification loss of the
surrogate model:
arg max
A′,X′
(max
c′t 6=ct
lnZt,c′t − lnZt,ct), t ∈ V
s.t.
∑
i
∑
j
|Xi,j −X ′i,j |+
∑
u<v
|Au,v −A′u,v| ≤ ∆ (5)
where Z = fθ(A′, X ′) is the output of the surrogate model, A′
and X ′ are the perturbed adjacency matrix and feature matrix,
respectively.
3.3.2 GradArgmax
GradArgmax uses vanilla GCN as a surrogate model to maximize
the cross-entropy loss described in Eq.(3) by gradient ascent. As
the loss function L and target node t are specified, GradArgmax
computes the partial derivative of Lt with respect to each con-
nected edge of the adjacency matrix:
∇G = ∇ALt = ∂Lt
∂A
, (6)
where Lt denotes the targeted loss w.r.t node t.
To preserve the discreteness of adjacency matrix A,
GradArgmax greedily flips those edges with ∆-largest magnitude
of gradients. In addition, the adjacency matrix is stored as a
sparse one in order to avoid excessive computational costs, but
only gradients of the connected edges could be extracted, which
means that attacks are restricted to the deletion of edges only, and
information on surrogate gradients is not fully utilized.
4 SIMPLIFIED GRADIENT-BASED ATTACK
In this work, we simply focus on the structure attack1, our method
can be easily extended to the feature attack (either binary or
continuous features) as well, just by taking into account the
gradients of the input features. In the node classification scenario
detailed in section 3.1, the goal of an attacker is to perturb the
original graph G = (A,X) with limited budgets ∆ and further
lead to a misclassification of target models.
1. We follow the attack settings of Nettack [12] which modifies graph
structure and node features by flipping them from 0 to 1 or vice verse. Since
node features in the real-world dataset may be continuous (not binary), it is
difficult to constrain attacks within a given budget ∆ ∈ N.
To conduct attacks on the target models without additional
prior knowledge, inspired by the adversarial methods mentioned
above, the proposed SGA follows these steps: (i) Train a surrogate
model locally. (ii) Extract a k-hop subgraph. (iii) Choose to add
or remove edges based on the surrogate gradients.
4.1 Train a Surrogate Model
The most frequently used surrogate model is vanilla GCN, how-
ever, it has significant drawbacks as described in section 3.2, we
use a k-layer SGC as our surrogate model instead. The output of
a k-layer SGC can be formulated as
Z = fθ(A,X) = softmax (Aˆ
kXW ) , (7)
First and foremost, we train SGC on the input graph until
convergence with fine-tuned hyper-parameters. In fact, the goal is
to obtain the final weight matrix θ = {W}, which will be used
later to guide the attack in our method.
4.2 Extract a k-hop Subgraph
Given a target node t, it should to be classified as another class to
achieve our goal. Therefore, we design the targeted misclassifica-
tion loss function as follows:
L˜t = max
c′t 6=ct
lnZt,c′t − lnZt,ct , t ∈ V , (8)
where Zt,ct indicates the predicted probability that node t belongs
to class ct. According to Eq.(8), to compute the targeted loss
L˜t, we only need to compute Zt, a row-vector of Z. Therefore,
computing {Zu|u ∈ V and u 6= t} is unnecessary and redundant.
This motivates us to simplify the computation.
Theorem 1. Given a normalized adjacency matrix Aˆ with self-
loops, i.e., Aˆu,u 6= 0,∀u ∈ V . let D(u, v) denotes the
shortest distance between u and v, thus
[Aˆk]u,v
{
= 0, if D(u, v) > k
6= 0, if D(u, v) ≤ k (9)
Proof 4.1. The detailed proof is omitted for the sake of brevity.
Given a specific target node t ∈ V , it is clear that L˜t depends
on Zt only, where Zt = [Aˆk]tXW . So what we need is to
compute [Aˆk]t, a row-vector of Aˆk. According to Theorem 1, we
can construct a k-hop subgraph G(sub) = (A(sub), X) consisting
of:
Vs = {u | D(t, u) ≤ k},
Es = {(u, v) | D(t, u) ≤ k and D(t, v) ≤ k} (10)
The set of nodes Vs can also be considered as the k-hop neighbors
of target node t.
4.3 Fast Gradient Computation with the Subgraph
4.3.1 Vanilla SGA
Gradient-based algorithm is an efficient and effective method
for attack. Similar to GradArgmax, the gradient matrix w.r.t the
subgraph will be computed as follows:
∇G(sub) = ∇A(sub)L˜(sub)t , (11)
where L˜(sub)t = maxc′t 6=ct lnZ
(sub)
t,c′t
− lnZ(sub)t,ct denotes the
targeted loss computed using subgraph and it is derived from
Eq.(8), Z(sub)t = f(A
(sub), X) ∈ R1×C denotes the prediction
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Fig. 2: The prediction probability of the first and
next most probable (second) class of SGC on Cite-
seer and Cora before and after calibration.
probability vector of target node t using subgraph. Note that,
to ensure Aˆ(sub)u,v = Aˆu,v,∀u, v ∈ Vs, we must add self-loop
for each node u ∈ Vs, and normalize A˜(sub) using D˜ the
same as A˜. Following this, apparently Z(sub)t = Zt according
to theorem 1. As described in Eq.(11), the partial derivative of
L˜t w.r.t the adjacency matrix A(sub) is computed for each edge
e = (u, v) ∈ Es.
However, as stated by Guo et al. [33], most of the modern
neural networks are poorly calibrated, and the probability asso-
ciated with the predicted class label doesn’t reflect its ground-
truth correctness likelihood. On the contrary, a neural network
appears to be overconfident on the predictions. As shown in the
top of Figure 2, the model is so confident that it gives very high
probability for the predicted class (Zt,ct → 1), but for other
classes even the next most probable one, it gives an extremely
low probability (maxc′t 6=ct Zt,c′t → 0). As a result, the first term
of targeted loss L˜(sub)t rounds to minus infinity while the second
term rounds to zero. This results in the gradients vanishing and
thus the attack performance is negatively affected. To overcome
the gradient vanishing problem, a scale factor  > 1 is introduced
to calibrate the output, and the targeted loss is redefined as follows:
Z
(sub)
t = fθ(A
(sub), X, ) = softmax (
Aˆ(sub)kXW

),
L˜(sub)t = max
c′t 6=ct
lnZ
(sub)
t,c′t
− lnZ(sub)t,ct , t ∈ V
(12)
By introducing a scale factor , the output of the model will no
longer reach the extreme value 0 or 1 (See the bottom of Figure
2), and the gradients will be calculated as normal.
4.3.2 SGA with nodes reduction
Furthermore, there is another crucial problem that only the gra-
dients of connected edge ei ∈ Es will be computed, resulting in
edges deletion only the same as GradArgmax. To solve this prob-
lem, it is also important to consider the gradients of the non-edges
that might be connected later. Unfortunately, the possible number
of non-edges is almost N2 and the computation of gradients is
very costly. Inspired by DICE [34], a straightforward way to attack
is “Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally”. Following this, we
will only consider those nodes that belong to different classes to
construct a non-edge set. However, there are a large number of
nodes that meet this criteria. To avoid excessive computation, we
empirically add nodes and edges fulfill
Vp = {u | cu = c′t, u ∈ V } ,
Ep = A× Vp , (13)
where c′t = arg maxc′ 6=ct Zt,c′ is the next most probable class
obtained from surrogate model SGC, A ⊆ V is the set of attacker
nodes and the perturbations are constrained to these nodes [12].
In particular, we set A = {t} for direct attack and A = N (t)
for influence attack where N (t) is the set of neighboring nodes
adjacent to t. We term these nodes in Vp as “potential nodes” and
edges inEp as “potential edges” since they may be included in this
subgraph later. Eq.(13) shows that we prefer to connect attacker
nodes in A with potential nodes to influence the target node t.
Therefore, the targeted loss can be also simplified as
L˜(sub)t = lnZ(sub)t,c′t − lnZ
(sub)
t,ct , t ∈ V (14)
Figure 3 shows the simplified gradient-based attack using a
subgraph, where we not only extract the k-hop subgraph centered
at the target node, but also add some potential nodes to extend the
subgraph. By doing so, we can compute the gradients of potential
edges in this extended subgraph, and our method is available to
add adversarial edges as well.
As discussed above, it is clear that |Vp| = NC . As an extreme
case suppose there are only a few classes in the dataset, i.e., C is
small enough. In this case, it can be derived that |Vp| = NC ≈ N ,
the scale of potential nodes comes larger as unbearable. Consider
that we only have a budget ∆ for a target node, which means that
we can add ∆ edges at most. To further improve the efficiency,
we will eventually leave ∆ potential nodes Vˆp ⊆ Vp, where the
gradients of potential edges between t and them are ∆-largest, i.e.
Vˆp = {u | ∇G(sub)t,u is ∆ -largest, u ∈ Vp},
Eˆp = A× Vˆp
(15)
Let V (sub) = Vs ∪ Vˆp, E(sub) = Es ∪ Eˆp, the scale of
the subgraph G(sub) comes smaller. We only need to compute
∇
G
(sub)
u,v
for each (non-)edge (u, v) ∈ E(sub). Either the input
graph is sparse or not, it’s obvious that |E(sub)|  |E|. Besides,
computing Z(sub)t using A
(sub) can be done in constant time and
it further improves the efficiency.
4.4 Iterative Gradient-based Attack
To better capture the actual change of the surrogate loss, we
will sequentially compute the gradients after adding or removing
an edge [15]. Let Z(i)t and Z
(subi)
t denote the prediction of
target node t at the ith time using the whole graph and sub-
graph, respectively. A(subi), V (subi), E(subi) are defined in the
same way. Specifically, A(sub0) = A(sub), V (sub0) = V (sub),
E(sub0) = E(sub).
At each time i+1, we flip one edge e = (u, v) ∈ E(subi) with
largest magnitude of gradient that fullfils the constraints [35]:{
Connect (u, v), if ∇G(subi) > 0 and A(subi)u,v = 0
Disconnect (u, v), if ∇G(subi) < 0 and A(subi)u,v = 1
(16)
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radius (k) of neighborhood of target node. If a node
becomes closer to the target node within k-distance,
the edges connected to it should be considered as
well.
To conclude, we define the structure score as follows to simplify
Eq.(16):
S = ∇G(subi)  (−2A(subi) + 1) , (17)
where  denotes Hadamard product. The adversarial edge (u, v)
is selected based on the largest structure score. After an edge is
selected, we update the subgraph G(subi+1) as follows:
V (subi+1) = V (subi),
E(subi+1) = E(subi) − {e},
A(subi+1) = A(subi) ⊕ e,
(18)
where ⊕ denotes the “exclusive or” operation, for e = (u, v),
if A(subi)u,v = 0 then A
(subi+1)
u,v = 1 and vice versa. However,
it will results in Z(subi)t 6= Z(i)t ,∀i > 0. We explain it with
Figure 4, when a potential edge is connected, if a node becomes
closer to the target node within k-distance, the edges adjacent to
it should be considered as well, so as to preserve the k-order
message aggregation of graph convolution. Therefore, if an edge
Algorithm 1 Simplified gradient-based attack (SGA)
Input:
Graph G = (A,X), attack budget ∆, target node t, ground-
truth label ct, labeled nodes VL, hyper-parameter k for surro-
gate model SGC;
Output:
Perturbed graph G′t w.r.t target node t;
1: θ ← train the surrogate model on labeled nodes VL;
2: c′t = arg maxc′ 6=ct Zt,c′ ← predict the next most probable
class of t ;
3: Extract the k-hop subgraph centered at t ;
4: Initialize the subgraph G(sub) = (A(sub), X) via node reduc-
tion with Eq.(15);
5: A(sub0), E(sub0), V (sub0) ← A(sub), E(sub), V (sub);
6: for i = 0 to ∆− 1 do
7: Z
(subi)
t = fθ(A
(subi), X, );
8: Compute ∇G(subi) with Eq.(11);
9: Compute structure score S with Eq.(17);
10: Select e = (u, v) with largest structure score Su,v;
11: Update A(subi+1), E(subi+1), V (subi+1) with Eq.(19);
12: end for
13: return G′t;
e = (u, v) ∈ E(subi) is connected (assume that v is a potential
node), we must expand the subgraph as follows:
V (subi+1) = V (subi) ∪ {v′ | v′ ∈ N (v) if D(t, v′) ≤ k},
E(subi+1) = E(subi) ∪ (E(exp) − {e}),
A(subi+1) = A(subi) ⊕ (E(exp) ∪ {e}),
(19)
where E(exp) = {(v, v′) | v′ ∈ N (v) if D(t, v′) ≤ k} is the
expended edges set where nodes become closer within k-distance.
Since the scale of potential nodes is small enough after the
nodes reduction, the subgraph expansion does not negatively affect
the efficiency2. The details of iterative SGA is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
4.5 Analysis of Time and Space Complexity
In order to better describe our method, we compare the complexity
of time and space with other state-of-the-art methods: Nettack and
GradArgmax.
2. In contrast, if an edge is disconnected from the subgraph, the message
aggregation will be blocked automatically for those nodes beyond k-distance.
7TABLE 2: Time and Space Complexity of Adver-
sarial Attack Algorithms.
Methods Space complexity Time complexity
Nettack O(|E|) O(∆ · |A| ·N · d2)
GradArgmax O(|E|) or O(N2) O(∆ + |E|d2) or O(∆ +N2d2)
SGA O(dk + ∆ · |A|) O(∆ · (dk + ∆ · |A|) · dk)
4.5.1 Nettack
Due to store the entire graph (as a sparse matrix), the space com-
plexity of Nettack comes to O(|E|). Besides, Nettack computes
the misclassification loss sequentially w.r.t the perturbed graph
for each edge in the candidate set, the time complexity is up to
O(∆ · |A| · N · d2) without considering feature attack, where d
denotes the average degrees of nodes in the graph.
4.5.2 GradArgmax
While storing the entire graph with a sparse matrix, the space
complexity of GradArgmax will be O(|E|). If a dense instantia-
tion of the adjacency matrix is used, the space complexity comes
to O(N2). It’s worth mentioning that, for the adjacency matrix in
sparse form, the algorithm is only capable for edge deletion, while
both adding and deleting edges are available for the dense one.
Besides, GradArgmax only computes gradients once, so the major
time complexity depends on the computation of gradients and it is
approximate O(∆+ |E|d2) or O(∆+N2d2) for sparse or dense
matrix3.
4.5.3 SGA
Our method only stores the subgraph with a sparse matrix, thus the
space complexity is only O(|E(sub)|). After the nodes reduction,
E(sub) consists of edges of k-hop subgraph and a few potential
edges, which comes to |E(sub)| = dk + ∆ · |A|, apparently
|E(sub)|  |E| for a sparse graph. Moreover, the time complexity
depends on the message aggregation between the k-hop neighbors
of the target node in A(sub), thereby the time complexity leads
to O(∆ · |E(sub)| · dk). Given |E(sub)| = dk + ∆ · |A|, it can
be simplified as O(∆ · (dk + ∆ · |A|) · dk). The complexity of
the three methods is summarized in Table 2, where the use of
memory refers to the use of graph (subgraph). It is clear that SGA
theoretically achieves both time and space efficiency compared to
Nettack and GradArgmax.
5 UNNOTICEABLE ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
ON GRAPH DATA
Specifically, in the scenario of adversarial attack, attackers would
attempt to perform perturbations by modifying the input data
while guaranteeing unnoticeability to avoid the detection. Unlike
the continuous data that lies in Euclidean Space, attackers can
evaluate the attack impacts by measuring the changes before and
after attack via `2 norm or `∞ norm [16]. However, it is difficult
to quantify the attack impacts on graph data that lies in such a
non-Euclidean Space.
An important property of a graph is the degree distribu-
tion, which often appears as a power-law distribution [37], i.e.,
3. Refer to [36], the time complexity of GCN is O(|E|d2), and the
computation of gradients can be accelerated by parallel computing, which is
also suitable for SGA.
(out, in)
disassortative
(in, out)
assortative
(out, out)
disassortative
(in, in)
assortative
Fig. 5: Typical Example of Assortative or Disassor-
tative networks. The fuzzy edges indicate that nodes
can have any number of edges of this type. (Image
Credit: Foster et al. [19])
p(x) ∝ x−q , where q is the scaling parameter. It is easy to tell
if two graphs have similar degree distributions after q is given.
However, there is no solution for estimating q exactly yet. To
this end, Zu¨gner et al. [12] derive an efficient way to check for
violations of the degree distribution after attacks. Specifically, they
estimate q for a clean graph and q′ for a perturbed graph to ensure
that the attack is unnoticeable if the following equation is fulfilled:
Λ (q, q′;G,G′) < τ ≈ 0.004 ,
where Λ is a discriminate function defined in [12], G denotes the
original graph and G′ the perturbed one.
In this section, we refer to another solution and apply it to
measure the attack impacts, degree assortativity coefficient [18],
[19], it measures the tendency of nodes connected to each other.
To clarify this, we first define the degree mixing matrix M , where
Mi,j denotes the tendency of nodes with degree i connected to
nodes with degree j, the value can be counts, joint probability, or
occurrences of node degree. Let α, β ∈ {in, out} denote the type
of in-degree and out-degree, respectively. We first ensure that M
fulfills the following rules:∑
ij
Mi,j = 1,
∑
j
Mi,j = αi,
∑
i
Mi,j = βj , (20)
Particularly, in an undirected graph, αi = βj , ∀i = j. Then
we define the degree assortativity coefficient by using Pearson
Correlation [38]:
r(α, β) =
∑
ij ij(Mi,j − αiβj)
σασβ
, (21)
where σα and σβ are the standard deviations of the distributions
α and β, respectively. The value of r lies in the range of
−1 ≤ r ≤ 1, and r = −1 for disassortativity while r = 1 for
assortativity. Figure 5 shows the four degree-degree correlations in
a directed network, which reflects the correlation between nodes
in the network as well.
8Degree assortativity coefficient r is easier to compute than
degree distribution coefficient q, and better reflects the graph struc-
ture. Based on this, we propose Degree Assortativity Change
(DAC), which is defined as
DAC =
Er( |rG − rG′ti | )
rG
, ∀ti (22)
where G′ti denotes the perturbed graph w.r.t target node ti.
Attackers will conduct attack for each target node ti by performing
perturbations on the original graph G. DAC measures the average
impacts on attacking a group of target nodes {ti}, and the smaller
the DAC is, the less noticeable the attack will be.
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments aiming to
answer the following research questions:
RQ1 How much can SGA improve in terms of time and space
efficiency and how does it work for the proposed metric
DAC?
RQ2 Can SGA achieve a comparable attack performance while
using only a certain part of nodes to attack the graph?
RQ3 Can SGA scale to larger datasets and retain its attack perfor-
mance?
In what follows, we first detail the experimental settings, followed
by answering the above three research questions.
6.1 Experimental Settings
Datasets. We evaluate the performance of our method on four
well-known datasets: Citeseer, Cora, Pubmed [39] and Reddit
[40]. The first three are commonly citation networks on node
classification tasks, where nodes are documents and edges among
them are citation relations. The last one is a large scale dataset
of online discussion forums where user posts and comments on
content in different topical communities. We follow the setting of
Nettack [12] and only consider the largest connected component
of the graph for each dataset. In addition, we randomly select 20%
of nodes to constitute the training set (half of them are treated as
the validation set), and treat the remaining as the testing set. Table
3 is an overview of the datasets.
Target Model. We consider poisoning attack, i.e., models are
retrained until the convergence after attacks [23], which is more
challenging for attackers but reflects real-world scenarios better.
To evaluate the transferability of our method, we conduct attack
on several commonly used graph neural networks: GCN [8], SGC
[17], GAT [41], GraphSAGE [40], ClusterGCN [42]. For each
target model, our method is compared with other adversarial attack
methods.
• GCN [8]. GCN is one of the most representative graph neural
networks that learns hidden representations by encoding both
local graph structure and node features.
• SGC [17]. SGC is a linear variant of GCN that has been
proposed recently, which achieves competitive results and
even significantly improves the training efficiency.
• GAT [41]. GAT enhances GCN by leveraging a masked
self-attention mechanism to specifying different weights to
different neighbor nodes.
• GraphSAGE [40]. GraphSAGE is a general inductive frame-
work, which uniformly samples a set of neighbors with a
TABLE 3: Dataset statistics. Only consider the
largest connected component of the graph for each
dataset.
Statistics Citeseer Cora Pubmed Reddit
#Nodes 2,110 2,485 19,717 232,965
#Edges 3,668 5,069 44,324 11,723,402
#Density 0.082% 0.082% 0.011% 0.022%
#Average Degrees 3.50 4.08 4.50 99.65
fixed size, instead of using a full-neighborhood set during
training.
• ClusterGCN [42]. This is the state-of-the-art mini-batch
GCN framework. It samples n subgraphs whose nodes have
high correlations under a graph clustering algorithm and
restricts the message aggregation within these subgraphs.
Evaluation Protocols. In the task of node classification, we
aim to perform perturbations and further cause misclassification of
target models. To this end, we evaluate the classification accuracy
and classification margin (CM). Given a target node t, CM is
defined as the probability margin between ground-truth label ct
and the next most probable class label c′t, which lies in the range
of [−1, 1]. The smaller CM means better attack performance. In
particular, a successful attack is often with CM less than zero.
Baselines. We compare our method with four other baseline
methods and conduct attack using two strategies respectively (i.e.,
direct attack and influence attack). For a fair comparison, all
methods will use the same surrogate model SGC (if necessary),
and share the same weights θ. Follow the setting of Nettack [12],
the attack budget ∆ is set to the degrees of target node t.
• Random Attack (RA). RA randomly adds or removes edges
between attacker nodes and other nodes in the graph with
probability p1. This is the simplest way to conduct attacks.
• DICE [34]. DICE is originally a heuristic algorithm for
disguising communities. In our experiment, DICE randomly
decides whether to connect or disconnect an edge with proba-
bility p2 between attacker nodes and other nodes in the graph.
Besides, there is a constraint that only nodes belonging to the
same class/different classes will be disconnected/connected.
• GradArgmax [13]. Since the attack budget ∆ is defined as
the degrees of target node t, the original GradArgmax will
remove all edges connected with t for direct attack, which is
unreasonable and unfair to compare. Therefore, we use the
variant of GradArgmax, which requires a dense instantiation
of the adjacency matrix and computes the gradients of all N2
edges.
• Nettack [12]. Nettack is the strongest baseline that can
modify the graph structure and node features. As we focus on
the structure attack, we restrict Nettack to modify the graph
structure with budget ∆ only.
Parameter Settings. The hyper-parameters of target models
are fine-tuned in the clean graph for each dataset. Particularly, the
radius k = 2 and the scale factor  = 5.0 for each dataset. We
adopt the node reduction when generating adversarial examples,
where the number of added potential nodes is set to ∆. For RA and
DICE, p1 and p2 are both fixed at 0.5. All models are implemented
in Tensorflow4, running on a NVIDIA RTX 2080Ti GPU.
4. https://www.tensorflow.org/
9TABLE 4: Average time (s), memory usage, and DAC to generate adversarial examples using both attack
strategies. The statistics of random algorithms RA and DICE are omitted. OOM stands for a method that
could not be used to attack due to the limitations of GPU RAM.
Methods Citeseer Cora Pubmed Reddit
Direct Attack Time Memory DAC Time Memory DAC Time Memory DAC Time Memory DAC
GradArgmax 0.188 17MB 7.9E-2 0.297 23MB 2.9E-3 13.856 1483MB 4.2E-3 N/A OOM -
Nettack 0.722 66KB 3.2E-2 1.151 89KB 1.4E-3 39.526 769KB 1.3E-3 N/A 180MB -
SGA 0.006 2KB 3.4E-2 0.011 2KB 1.7E-3 0.020 4KB 1.8E-3 12.236 14MB 2.5E-6
Influence Attack Time Memory DAC Time Memory DAC Time Memory DAC Time Memory DAC
GradArgmax 0.239 17MB 1.7E-2 0.321 23MB 1.1E-3 14.412 1483MB 9.2E-4 N/A OOM -
Nettack 2.104 89KB 1.6E-2 3.969 66KB 9.4E-4 120.821 769KB 8.1E-4 N/A 180MB -
SGA 0.008 5KB 1.7E-2 0.012 6KB 1.0E-3 0.021 7KB 8.7E-4 14.571 14MB 1.9E-6
100 101 102 103 104 105
Relative Time
Citeseer
Citeseer-In.
Cora
Cora-In.
Pubmed
Pubmed-In.
  31x   120x  1x
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  686x   5753x  1x
GradArgmax
Nettack
SGA
Fig. 6: Performance over running time on three
datasets for direct and influence attack.
Attack Settings. Our experiments involve two parts: (i) Gen-
erating adversarial examples. For each dataset, we first randomly
select 1,000 nodes from testing set as target nodes, and generate
adversarial examples for them separately using different attack
methods. (ii) Conduct attack through adversarial examples. After
adversarial examples are generated, we conduct poisoning attacks
on the surrogate model SGC, and further transfer it to other
commonly used graph neural networks.
6.2 Performance on Generating Adversarial Examples
(RQ1)
As described in Table 2, our method is highly efficient in terms
of time and space complexity compared to other methods. For
running time, here we theoretically analyze how much improve-
ment our method can achieve over Nettack, the state-of-the-
art adversarial attack method. Following the parameter settings
described in section 6.1, i.e., k = 2 and ∆ = d, the relative time
complexity can be approximated as
O(d · |A| ·N · d2)
O(d · (d2 + d · |A|) · d2) = O(
|A| ·N
d2 + d · |A| ) , (23)
This means that SGA can theoretically achieve |A|·Nd2+d·|A| times
speedup compared to Nettack, and it will be higher for larger and
sparser graphs.
Table 4 shows the performance of generating adversarial
examples with direct and influence attack strategies. Here the
training time of the surrogate model is excluded and memory
usage refers to the usage of storing the graph (subgraph). Please
note that we do not compare the running time and memory usage
with RA and DICE since they both are random algorithms and
comparison doesn’t make sense. Because the three datasets are
sparse enough with small degrees on average (see Table 3), the
two-hop subgraph is much smaller and SGA has a remarkable
improvement in efficiency. Intuitively, we plot the performance of
Nettack and GradArgmax over their running time relative to that
of SGA on three datasets in Figure 6. Considering the Citeseer
dataset (statistics are in Table 3) and the direct attack setting (i.e.,
|A| = 1), the theoretical speedup comes to 134 times according
to Eq.(23), which is approximately consist with the experimental
results (120 times).
Table 4 indicates that our method is much more efficient than
GradArgmax and Nettack in terms of time and space complex-
ity. Even if the dataset grows in size, SGA still remains high
efficiency as if the graph is sparse enough. On Pubmed dataset,
our method can even yield up to three orders of magnitude
speedup over Nettack, also, SGA is much more memory efficient.
On the contrary, Nettack becomes less efficient, especially when
performing influence attacks on a larger dataset, the reason is
that the larger scale of attacker nodes A and candidate edges
set. As for GradArgmax, the running time and memory usage
are similar between direct and influence attacks, since it computes
the gradients of the entire graph all the time and the candidate
edges set are always the same. In addition, both of them failed
on Reddit dataset, a large and dense graph, but SGA still achieves
high efficiency.
In respect to the metric DAC, Table 4 shows that: (i) Direct
attacks have greater impacts than influence attacks, it is clear and
interpretable since perturbations are restricted in the neighborhood
of the target node, leading to the significant degree changes espe-
cially the target node. Naturally, the concentrated perturbations
will exert a greater influence; (ii) Nettack achieves the most
unnoticeable influence because it is enforced to preserve the
graph’s degree distribution during attacks. Our method leverages
the subgraph instead of the entire graph without any constraints on
the degree distribution, thus achieving a slightly worse result but
still better than GradArgmax. Note that, GradArgmax considers
all N2 edges as a candidate set to flip, it will largely affect the
degree distribution of nodes in the graph, and the attack becomes
more noticeable.
6.3 Performance on Attacking Graph Neural Networks
(RQ2)
For the target model SGC, whose details of the architecture are
transparent (but not for its weights), it can be approximately
treated as a white-box attack if it is used as a surrogate model.
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TABLE 5: Accuracy(%) of direct attack and influence attack on two small scale datasets. Here the best
results are boldfaced.
Methods Citeseer Cora
Direct Attack SGC GCN GAT GraphSAGE Cluster-GCN SGC GCN GAT GraphSAGE Cluster-GCN
Clean 71.8 71.6 72.1 71.0 71.4 83.1 83.5 84.2 82.0 83.2
RA 62.0 63.6 59.0 61.9 62.8 67.5 68.8 69.7 68.8 68.1
DICE 55.0 57.8 54.6 56.6 57.1 58.4 60.2 61.8 59.7 59.5
GradArgmax 12.2 13.2 21.5 32.4 34.8 25.2 32.6 34.5 30.9 45.6
Nettack 3.7 6.0 20.5 27.9 30.9 1.0 2.4 17.6 27.2 17.8
SGA 1.8 3.8 20.3 30.2 19.9 1.5 2.1 15.9 25.8 17.6
Influence Attack SGC GCN GAT GraphSAGE Cluster-GCN SGC GCN GAT GraphSAGE Cluster-GCN
RA 71.2 71.1 71.4 68.8 70.8 80.9 83.0 86.0 81.4 83.0
DICE 69.4 71.1 70.2 67.5 68.4 80.5 82.4 85.4 79.8 82.7
GradArgmax 47.8 48.1 51.2 46.7 55.4 65.1 70.8 73.8 74.7 72.9
Nettack 31.4 39.2 49.3 41.9 49.8 48.4 56.4 63.2 63.5 60.0
SGA 33.1 38.5 45.2 40.2 48.1 46.2 56.2 62.6 62.8 57.1
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Fig. 7: Results on Cora dataset using direct attack (top) and influence attack (-In, bottom). “NTK” is short
for Nettack and “GA” is short for GradArgmax.
However, for other graph neural network models, this is a com-
plete black-box attack without any prior knowledge.
As shown in Table 5, we report the percentages of target
nodes that are correctly classified, where clean stands for results
in the original graph. The classification performance of SGC
drops significantly against direct attacks. Even against influence
attacks, SGC is more vulnerable than other classifiers. Unlike
SGC, other models are more robust even in the direct attack
setting. There are four possible reasons to explain this: (i) The
nonlinear activation function. SGC and GCN are similar except
for activation functions. SGC drops the nonlinear activation in the
hidden layer and collapses weight matrices between consecutive
layers. Although SGC behaves more efficient during training,
the simplification leads to the lower robustness than GCN. (ii)
The details of model architectures are not exposed to attackers
like SGC, and the performance depends on the transferability of
attacks; (iii) The message aggregation methods are more robust
than simple graph convolution. For instance, GAT introduces the
attention mechanism and enables (implicitly) to specify different
weights to different nodes in a neighborhood. For GraphSAGE,
the most robust one in most of the datasets, we argue that it is
probably on account of the concatenate operation on the node’s
message and the neighborhoods’, which is aggregated with mean
operation. By doing so, the influence of attacker nodes will be
largely alleviated. (iv) Pre-processing of the input graph. For
Cluster-GCN, it samples several subgraphs whose nodes have high
correlations using a graph clustering algorithm and restricts the
message aggregation within these subgraphs, which also reduces
the influence of attacker nodes.
In Figure 7, we can see that SGA achieves a considerable
performance in most cases by comparing the results with different
attack methods. Nettack, a strong baseline, also yields a signifi-
cant performance as reported in [12]. Most remarkably, even in
attacking other robust graph neural networks (GAT, GraphSAGE,
Cluster-GCN), most of the classifiers are strongly affected by
perturbations especially performed by SGA and Nettack. The
obtained results have proved the vulnerability of graph neural
networks and are consistent with the previous studies. Not surpris-
ingly, influence attacks achieve a worse performance compared
with direct attacks, and random algorithms RA and DICE both
have a slight attack effect on attacking different graph neural
networks as expected. Both GradArgmax and SGA are gradient-
based methods, we can also see that GradArgmax performs worse
than our method SGA although the whole graph is used to attack.
The possible explanations for the results are as follows: (i) The
misclassification loss designed in Eq.(12) considers the loss of
the next most probable class label as well as the ground-truth
label, which is available to better exploit the vulnerability of graph
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TABLE 6: Accuracy(%) of direct attack and influ-
ence attack on two large scale datasets. Here the best
results are boldfaced.
Methods Pubmed Reddit
Direct Attack SGC GCN GAT GraphSAGE Cluster-GCN SGC GCN
Clean 84.2 86.5 85.3 86.1 85.7 93.8 93.6
RA 76.6 78.2 75.0 81.5 75.8 88.6 89.4
DICE 65.0 67.1 57.8 72.3 64.0 84.2 88.2
GradArgmax 14.8 15.8 16.9 42.7 48.3 - -
Nettack 2.0 3.4 10.9 32.4 19.9 - -
SGA 1.6 2.0 9.3 30.6 15.7 1.2 5.4
Influence Attack SGC GCN GAT GraphSAGE Cluster-GCN SGC GCN
RA 84.1 86.2 85.3 87.2 84.6 93.6 93.5
DICE 83.6 85.9 84.7 85.8 84.4 93.7 93.7
GradArgmax 73.2 77.8 72.7 84.0 76.2 - -
Nettack 61.4 72.0 70.1 85.4 69.2 - -
SGA 63.4 70.7 70.0 82.6 67.8 78.9 83.6
neural networks. (ii) As detailed in section 4.3.1, the surrogate
model appears to make an overconfident output and it causes the
vanishing of gradients. SGA introduces a scale factor to calibrate
the surrogate model, the gradient vanishing is alleviated and
achieves a performance gain. (iii) SGA focuses on a part of nodes
— the k-hop subgraph of the target node and some potential nodes.
As a result, the generated perturbations will be more concentrated
and cause the misclassification of target classifiers much easier.
6.4 Scalability for Larger Datasets (RQ3)
As illustrated above, SGA achieves a considerable performance
on attacking most of graph neural networks on three small-scale
datasets and also ensures the time and space efficiency. To evaluate
the scalability of SGA, we extend our experiments to two larger
datasets — Pubmed and Reddit, the data statistics are described
in Table 3. Particularly, Reddit is a relatively dense graph with
node degrees up to 99.65 on average, which means that the attack
budgets are much higher than other datasets in our settings, and
naturally brings more challenges on time and memory usage.
As shown in Table 4, GradArgmax and Nettack become slower
and more memory usage is required on larger datasets. Especially
for the Reddit dataset, both GradArgmax and Nettack have failed
due to high time and space complexity. On the contrary, SGA has
similar time and memory usage on Pubmed dataset as it is sparse
like Citeseer and Cora. Even on Reddit dataset, SGA has high
efficiency in the direct attack (12.236s) and the influence attack
(14.571s) settings.
Furthermore, we conduct attacks on the same target models
by the generated adversarial examples. As shown in Table 6,
SGA achieves state-of-the-art results in all cases, a significant
performance decrease is observed on most of the target models
especially SGC. As data scale grows, random algorithms RA and
DICE have little or no effect on target models. On the largest
dataset Reddit, GradArgmax and Nettack have failed to conduct
attacks. But for SGA, the obtained results show that only a small
part of target nodes are correctly classified by SGC and GCN in
the direct attack setting. In the influence attack setting, SGA also
has an obvious effect on the target models compared to RA and
DICE. Results on Pubmed and Reddit datasets suggest that our
method can easily scale to larger datasets and significantly reduce
the performance of target models.
6.5 Ablation Study
In order to explore the effect of different radius on SGA, we report
the ablation test on Citeseer and Cora datasets from the various
1 2 3 4
Radius
0
20
40
60
80
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 
SGC
GCN
GAT
GraphSAGE
Cluster-GCN
(a) Citeseer
1 2 3 4
Radius
0
20
40
60
80
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 
SGC
GCN
GAT
GraphSAGE
Cluster-GCN
(b) Cora
Fig. 8: Performance of SGA on attacking different
graph neural network models with various radius on
Citeseer and Cora datasets.
radius of the subgraph, i.e., k = 1, 2, 3, 4. In Figure 8, it can be
observed that k = 2 achieves the best performance on attacking
SGC and GCN on both datasets. But for other target models, a
better performance is achieved when k = 1 or k = 3.
However, if k = 1 the subgraph includes only the immediate
neighboring nodes of the target node (except for potential nodes),
SGA can only delete the edges that are directly connected to the
target node and it is not permitted in the influence attack setting.
As the radius of the subgraph gets larger, the number of nodes
and edges increases exponentially, and it would require more time
and memory usage to perturb the graph. So we need to make a
trade-off between efficiency and performance. Given that the best
classification performance can be achieved by a two-layer GCN or
SGC in most datasets, SGA can exploit the vulnerability of graph
neural network models with only a two-hops subgraph, and the
efficiency of attack is also preserved.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we study the adversarial attacks on the (attributed)
graph and present a novel simplified gradient-based attack frame-
work focusing on the node classification task. Specifically, we aim
to poison the input graph and lead to the misclassification of graph
neural networks for several target nodes. Based on the extensive
experiments, our method SGA, which simply leverages a k-hop
subgraph of the target node, has achieved high efficiency in terms
of time and memory and also obtained comparable performance in
attacking different graph neural networks compared to other state-
of-the-art adversarial attack methods. It can be also observed that
SGA scales to larger datasets and achieves a remarkable perfor-
mance in the attack. In addition, we emphasize the importance of
measuring the attack impacts on graph data and further propose
DAC as a measure. The results show that DAC works as a practical
metric and SGA can also achieve a relatively unnoticeable attack
impact.
Our works mainly focus on the node classification task and the
targeted attack. For future work, we aim to extend our method and
generalize it to other graph analysis tasks with more flexibility.
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